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INTRODUCTION
Trust is an expectation that others will act in one’s own interest. Trust also
has a specialized meaning in Anglo-American law, denoting an arrangement
by which land or other property is managed by one party, a trustee, on behalf
of another party, a beneficiary.1 Fiduciary duties are duties enforced by law
and imposed on persons in certain relationships requiring them to act entirely
in the interest of another, a beneficiary, and not in their own interest.2 This
Essay is about the role that trust and fiduciary duty played in our legal system
five centuries ago and more.
The legal system of England, as it developed between the twelfth century
and the sixteenth century, set the structure and character of our modern law.
Common law, the law applied in England’s central royal courts, was the
dominant feature of this legal system. The long-understood story is that
English common law in its formative centuries was unacquainted with trust as
a legal device or as a human practice, and that fiduciary duties grew up outside
the common law in a separate court of chancery with the law of trusts and
trustees, only being incorporated a century and a half ago with the fusion of
law and equity.

∗

Professor of Law and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. The
Author’s citations to early English law reports, known as the Year Books, depart from the
Uniform System of Citation and conform to the author’s comprehensive database of the
Year Books, searchable at www.bu.edu/law/seipp.
1 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 5 (2011).
2 See id. at 1-5.
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Trusts were enforced by chancery, a court of equity, not by courts of
common law. Fiduciary duties and the law of trusts thus seemed to have
grown up outside the common law, in a different court that developed later
than the common law courts and was sometimes regarded as their adversary or
rival. Because the common law did not enforce the trusts nor their
predecessors, called uses, it is sometimes thought that uses and trusts were
invisible to the common law. In particular, an argument was made between
1526 and 1535 that uses did not exist at common law, but arose as instruments
of fraud and collusion.3
Professor Tamar Frankel has challenged lawmakers, lawyers, and judges to
put trust and fiduciary duty at the heart of modern law. In her honor, this
Essay explores the extent to which trust and fiduciary duty can be found at the
root of Anglo-American common law. While the common law did not enforce
uses, it took account of uses in many ways, and recognized and enforced
fiduciary duties in other relationships.4 Judges, lawyers, legislators, and
treatise writers integrated these uses into the fabric of the common law. They
wrote extensively about uses, and they identified trust as the essence of these
arrangements. The impression that the common law ignored uses arose after
uses had been familiar for two centuries. This impression arose from a
political assault on this pervasive landholding arrangement, with the intent to
collect more revenue for the king.
I.

RIGOR OF THE COMMON LAW

Early English common law acquired a reputation for rigor – for uniform
application of rules even in harsh circumstances that would seem to beg for
exceptions.5 Those who knew the rules well could use them to their advantage,
and those who lost out thereby were told by common law judges that it was
their own folly that they had not protected themselves. In part, the chancellor’s
jurisdiction in equity developed in order to mitigate the harshness of common
law rules. This is also why fiduciary duties, which became so closely linked to
the chancellor’s jurisdiction over trusts, can be thought to be contrary to the
spirit of the early common law. Here are some examples of common law rules
that seem to embody what might be called an anti-fiduciary impulse, a hostility
to trusting and fiduciary relationships.
In early contract law, if I became your debtor by a written, signed, and
sealed promise to pay (a bond), and then I fully repaid the debt to you, I would
trust you to destroy the bond, cancel it, or give me a written release. If you
instead did none of these things, you could then sue me in the king’s court on

3

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 254 (4th ed. 2002).
Id. at 251.
5 See id. at 102 (“The possibilities of technical failure were legion. And the growing
strength of substantive law could also work injustice, because the judges preferred to suffer
hardship in individual cases than to make exceptions to clear rules.”).
4
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the original debt, and my evidence of full repayment would not be received.6
Only outside the common law, in the equity court of the chancellor, could I
prove my repayment and enjoin my creditor from suing me at common law for
a second repayment of my debt.7
If I dispensed with the formalities of a sealed writing and I became your
debtor by a solemn oral promise to pay and a handshake, you would trust me to
keep my oral promise. But if I then refused to pay, the common law would let
me offer my sworn oath, called “wager of law,” as conclusive proof that I did
not owe the money. Doing so indicated both that I was willing to damn my
soul to eternal hell by lying under oath, and that I could pay eleven other
people, called oathhelpers, to damn their souls by swearing they believed me.8
Only in the church courts could I be prosecuted for my breach of promise, and
made to do penance by paying the sum that I owed as the price of getting back
into communion with the church.
Rules like these gave the impression that the early common law was devised
for shrewd, savvy schemers who knew the rules and knew how to exploit them.
The fools who trusted their neighbors to keep their promises, to act in good
faith, and to do what was expected of them had to look outside the common
law – or wait a few centuries for the law to develop a new remedy, like
trespass on the case for assumpsit, to rescue them. This impression of the early
common law resembles the “bad man’s view” of the law put forward by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his speech, The Path of the Law, delivered at Boston
University School of Law in 1897.9 The bad man would not see contracts as
6 BAKER, supra note 3, at 324-25; see, e.g., Fishacre v. Kirkham, Y.B. Mich. 17 Edw. 1,
pl. 2, 112 S.S. 322 (Common Pleas 1289) (Seipp Number: 1289.008ss) (providing that one
obligated in writing as a debtor could not allege payment without a specialty – a writing
under seal).
Year Book references herein are to the Vulgate (London 1678-1680) edition unless
otherwise indicated as:
−S.S.: Selden Society (1903- );
−Ames: Ames Foundation (1914- );
−Statham Abridgment: Nicholas Statham, Epitome Annalium Librorum Tempore
Henrici Sexti (c. 1490), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ames_
foundation/digital/Statham/StathamMetadata.html;
−Fitzherbert Abridgment: Anthony Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgment (London
1577).
Where available, references to the Author’s database are provided following the citation.
7 See, e.g., W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, reprinted in 4
OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 1, 25 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1914); Y.B.
Pasch. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 6 (Chancery, Exch. Ch. 1482) (1482.086); J.L. Barton, Equity
in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS 147 n.48 (Ralph
A. Newman ed., 1973).
8 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 74 (commenting that court porters provided professional
oathhelpers by the end of the sixteenth century).
9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
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obligations to fulfill his promises, but only as options either to perform as
promised or to pay the damages a court of law would award.10
Early English criminal law also seemed out of step with ordinary practices
of trusting and fiduciary relationships. The common law felonies of robbery
and burglary were crimes committed by strangers with force and violence.11 It
took several centuries for English law to extend felony liability to
embezzlement, fraud, and forgery – acts in which wrongdoers were servants or
agents of their victims or in transactions with their victims, and took advantage
of the trust their victims reposed in them.12
Matters of substance in the early common law were heavily influenced by
procedural, jurisdictional, and evidentiary rules, and these examples from early
contract and criminal law are no exceptions. Common law judges applied
rules of pleading and procedure in a sharply adversarial setting, a battle of wits
between rival advocates. One who pleaded badly could expect no mercy from
the other side, and none from the judge.13 But lack of trust inside the medieval
courtroom did not necessarily extend outward to the world outside the
courtroom, nor to the law applied outside the courtroom.
II.

THE MEDIEVAL USE

The common law’s inattention to notions of trust and fiduciary duty arose
most prominently in the field of property law. The early common law had
rigid rules of inheritance and feudal obligation. A dying landholder could not
leave land by will to whomever he or she wanted (except in the city of London
and some English boroughs by special local customs), but was forced to let it
descend to the eldest male heir.14 If an heir to land at the high social level
called knight service was under the age of twenty-one, the feudal lord of the
heir took the heir and the land into wardship.15 Wardship permitted a lord who
provided a reasonable maintenance for the heir to keep all the profits from the
heir’s land until the heir turned twenty-one.16 Wardship was thus a tremendous
financial windfall to lords who otherwise were left to fixed feudal services or
rents that over time had become hardly worth collecting.17 The lord could also
sell the right to arrange the underage heir’s marriage, another financial
windfall to the lord.18 But the lord collected these valuable rights only if the
land was inherited from the dying tenant, not given away during his life.
171 (1921); see also David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. REV. 515, 528 (1997).
10 Seipp, supra note 9, at 517.
11 BAKER, supra note 3, at 534.
12 Id. at 534-35.
13 See id. at 78.
14 See id. at 266-68.
15 Id. at 240.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 238, 241.
18 Id. at 240.
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These feudal incidents, as they were called, of wardship and marriage can be
viewed as a tax.19 They were broadly applicable, not subject to renegotiation,
and profited particularly the king, who was always lord and never tenant.20
Within this legal landscape, starting in the 1320s a social practice developed
that enabled landholders to avoid – a later king’s lawyers would say “evade” –
these feudal obligations.21 A landholder would transfer a bare legal title to a
small group of persons who would hold that land (in subordination to the same
feudal lord) for the benefit of the original landholder and then for whomever
the landholder would designate by will, thus circumventing the rule against
wills of land. This arrangement would delay transferring the land to an heir
until he or she reached the age of twenty-one, thus circumventing the feudal
incidents of wardship and marriage. A landholder could make provision for
daughters and younger sons, and could make greater provision for a surviving
spouse than the common law dower and curtesy afforded. He could also, by
means of a use, deprive the surviving spouse of those common law
entitlements. If a landholder wanted to give land at his or her death to the
church, this device also circumvented a statute of mortmain enacted in 1279
that would have prohibited or required an expensive license from the king for
such gifts of land.22
The standard terminology for this social practice was feoffment to uses.23
The landholder or feoffor granted or enfeoffed the land to feoffees to the use of
the intended beneficiary, or cestuy que use.24 The feoffees, nearly always at
least three in number, would hold the land in joint tenancy with right of
survivorship.25 This arrangement made it very unlikely that the legal title
would descend from a last surviving feoffee to that feoffee’s heir and give the
lord a potential wardship. It was very common for the feoffor to be the cestuy
que use. Similarly, in modern estate planning settlors set up trusts during their
lifetimes and are themselves the initial beneficiaries of their trusts, keeping all
of the income from the trust property until their deaths, and directing who next
would receive the trust property after their deaths.

19

Id. at 238.
See Id. at 241.
21 This account is based principally on Joseph Biancalana, The Medieval Use, in ITINERA
FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 111 (Richard Helmholz &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998). Also useful are J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH
FEUDALISM, 1215-1540, at 24 (1968); ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE
BLACK DEATH, 1348-1381, at 116 (1993); J.L. Barton, The Medieval Use, 81 L.Q. REV. 562,
562 (1965).
22 See SANDRA RABIN, MORTMAIN LEGISLATION AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH 1279-1500, at
29-30 (1982).
23 BAKER, supra note 3, at 249 n.4.
24 Id. at 250.
25 See id. (stating that multiple feoffees would help ensure against “individual
unscrupulousness”).
20
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Earlier legal historians supposed that uses were older than the 1320s. Roots
of the use and the trust have been proposed in the fideicommissum of Roman
law, the salman or treuhand of Germanic law,26 and the waqf of Islamic law,27
but the medieval use seems to have been an English invention.28 Domesday
Book, the survey of English landholding from 1086, noted lands said to have
been held ad usum (to the use of) someone or other.29 These were probably
lands put temporarily in the custody of others, such as when a landholder went
off on a pilgrimage. Landholders tried various custodial arrangements in the
thirteenth century.30 Uses were also preceded by conditional grants, in which
the terms of the feoffee’s intent, such as the obligation to convey the land to
the feoffor’s heir after the heir reached twenty-one, were spelled out as
conditions of the feoffee’s title. Such arrangements were caught by chapter six
of the Statute of Marlborough, enacted in 1267, which provided that
feoffments intended to deprive lords of their wardships were invalid, though
feoffments made in good faith were valid.31
What set the use apart from these earlier arrangements was the separation of
legal title from beneficial enjoyment of land. Feoffees to uses had the full
legal title to land, the right to sell or grant it, and the ability to sue and be sued
in relation to the land.32 The essential feature of uses, and what allowed them
to override the prohibition on wills of land, was that the beneficiary or cestuy
que use had no interest enforced by courts of common law and no remedy in
courts of common law against feoffees who misbehaved.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF USES OUTSIDE THE COMMON LAW
Uses developed in England and spread for several decades probably without
any regular enforcement by any courts. Feoffors set up such arrangements
relying entirely on the good will of their feoffees, who were bound only by
personal ties of friendship to carry out the wishes of the feoffor at the feoffor’s
death. But feoffees did not always do as they were told.
Because beneficiaries had no protection at common law, other courts
stepped in to fill the gap. The first courts to do so were England’s
ecclesiastical courts.33 Church courts maintained a jurisdiction separate from
the royal courts of common law. For instance, church courts had jurisdiction
over wills of personal property, which were permissible throughout England,

26

See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 410-11 (3d ed. 1945).
See GILBERT PAUL VERBIT, THE ORIGINS OF THE TRUST 114 (2002).
28 BAKER, supra note 3, at 248-49.
29 See id. at 225.
30 See Joseph Biancalana, Thirteenth Century Custodia, 22 J. LEGAL HIST. 14, 15-16
(2001).
31 Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 6 (1267), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 19.
32 BAKER, supra note 3, at 252.
33 Id. at 250.
27
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even though nearly all the land in England could not be devised by will.34
Church courts supervised executors of wills, appointed administrators for the
personal property of intestates, and arranged for guardians of orphaned
children. Church courts also dealt with a variety of trust-like arrangements in
which land was held by one person for the benefit of another.
Scholars have not explored all surviving records of medieval ecclesiastical
courts, but work by R.H. Helmholz, studying two courts with the best
surviving records, both in the county of Kent in southeastern England, has
shown that feoffees’s obligations to uses were enforced in these church courts
as early as 1375, and frequently in the first half of the fifteenth century.35 By
the 1460s, however, such cases were disappearing from the church courts,
because the king’s court of chancery was enforcing such uses.36
In 1402 the House of Commons prayed for a remedy, presumably by
legislation, against “disloyal” feoffees who sold or raised money on lands
instead of performing the wills of their feoffors.37 No statute was passed in
response to this request, but the fact that it was made shows that the practice of
feoffment to uses had become widespread and the problem of lack of
enforcement had risen to the attention of the king and Parliament.
The response came instead from one of the king’s principal officers, the
chancellor. Nearly all chancellors before 1530 were bishops or archbishops.38
They oversaw the royal writing office from which process issued for the
common law courts. By the 1380s, chancellors were also receiving and acting
upon petitions that complained of deficiencies and lack of remedies in the
courts of common law.39 By 1420, chancellors were receiving and acting upon
complaints that feoffees to uses were not acting in accordance with their
feoffors’ instructions.40 Petitioners complained that feoffees disregarded the
commands of their consciences by failing to carry out the deathbed intentions
of the feoffors who had given them title to their lands. It is not known how
much of the chancery’s business was taken up with enforcement of uses in the
middle of the fifteenth century, but feoffees who betrayed their feoffor’s trust
could be ordered by one of the king’s principal officers to act in accordance

34

1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (2004) (“[T]he
fundamental division between lands and chattels . . . would become the dividing line
between the jurisdiction of courts of church and state.”).
35 HELMHOLZ, supra note 34, at 421; R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (1979); Richard Helmholz, Trusts in English Ecclesiastical
Courts 1300-1640, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE, supra note 21, at 153, 157-60.
36 HELMHOLZ, supra note 34, at 421.
37 See 3 Rotuli Parliamentorum 511, 4 Hen. 4, no. 112 (1402) (The Parliament Rolls of
Medieval England, Scholarly Digital Editions, CD-ROM, rel. 2005), quoted in 4 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417 n.2 (3d ed. 1945).
38 HELMHOLZ, supra note 34, at 224.
39 BAKER, supra note 3, at 101-03.
40 Id. at 251.
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with their consciences. In the chancellor’s court, which came to be known as
equity, feoffees owed a fiduciary duty to carry out the feoffor’s wishes to
benefit the cestuy que use.
IV. ATTENTION TO USES IN THE COMMON LAW
The purpose of this Essay is to suggest that the medieval use was not
invisible to the common law and its judges and lawyers, nor foreign to their
learning and expertise. It is true that common law courts did not enforce uses,
and they provided no remedies for the beneficiaries against feoffees who
betrayed their feoffors’ expectations. In the eyes of the common law, the
feoffees had the full legal title, and the beneficiaries had nothing. A standard
illustration of the point is that Thomas Littleton, a Justice of Common Pleas,
wrote a book called New Tenures41 sometime between 1450 and 1460 in which
he set forth every type of landholding known to English lawyers, but included
no chapter on uses. According to a chief justice’s estimate reported in a 1502
case, the greater part of England already was held by feoffments to uses by the
time Littleton composed his treatise.42 The same chief justice also said that in
relation to feoffees, “by the course of the common law” their feoffor “had
nothing more to do with the land than the greatest strangers in the world.”43
This statement is an example of the extreme formalism of the early common
law.
Littleton did in fact mention uses in passing, very late in his treatise, in a
chapter on releases of future interests in land to the present possessors.44 He
called them feoffments “upon confidence to perform the will of the feoffor,”
and said that when such a feoffment was made, the law would presume “that
the feoffor ought presently to occupy the land at the will of his feoffees.”45
Littleton went on to say that a beneficiary of a use for lands of the required
value could even meet the property qualification for jury service. The chief
justice who spoke in 1502 about how much of England was held to uses in
Littleton’s time was referring to this same jury qualification issue.46

41 THOMAS LITTLETON, NEW TENURES, reprinted in LITTLETON’S TENURES (Eugene
Wambaugh ed., John Byrne & Co. 1903).
42 Dod v. Chyttynden, Y.B. Mich. 15 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 13a, 13b (C.P. 1502) (1499.025)
(Frowyk, C.J.C.P.: “al fesance de le Statut le grande part del’ terre d’ Angleterre fuit in
feoffements sur confidence”) (referring to statutes setting property qualifications for jury
service, the latest of which was enacted in 1429).
43 Dod v. Chyttynden, Caryll’s Reports 15 Hen. 7, pl. 258, 116 S.S. 392, 396 (C.P. 1502)
(Serjeant Frowyk: “per le course del common ley il nad pluis a faire ovesque le terre que le
pluis estrange en le mounde”) (stating that a feoffor could not, of his own right, take a
stranger’s animals that had come onto and damaged enfeoffed land, but could only do so in
a feoffee’s name).
44 LITTLETON, supra note 41, at §§ 462-64.
45 Id. § 463.
46 Edward Coke repeated Frowyk, C.J.C.P.’s point in his commentary on section 464 of
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The common law took notice of uses in another rule regarding who could
serve on juries. Parties could challenge prospective jurors who were related to
or were tenants or lords of their adversaries. The common law allowed parties
to challenge prospective jurors who were feoffees to uses when the opposing
party was a beneficiary of uses, and vice versa.47 Here the common law did
not regard beneficiaries, in relation to their feoffees, as the greatest strangers in
the world. The common law also took notice of uses in the law of
maintenance, which prohibited interference in the lawsuits of others. Before
he became a justice, Thomas Littleton said, and the Court of Common Pleas
agreed, that a beneficiary who maintained a feoffee to his use in the feoffee’s
lawsuit was not guilty of maintenance.48
Beginning in 1376, statutes were enacted in Parliament to fix problems that
had arisen with feoffments to uses. The essence of the use, that feoffees held
the title to land while a beneficiary derived profits from the land, had the
potential to work much mischief. So Parliament sought to prevent debtors
from concealing assets from creditors,49 to allow claimants in land disputes to
sue the real party in interest rather than the nominal titleholder,50 to prevent the
accumulation of wealth by the church,51 to permit purchasers from
beneficiaries of uses to rely upon their apparent title,52 and to preserve the
king’s rights to wardships of infant heirs and their lands.53 Applying and

Littleton’s Tenures. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND OR A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 464 (15th ed. 1836).
47 Y.B. Pasch. 3 Hen. 6, pl. 5, fol. 39a-39b (C.P. 1425) (1425.043) (forcing the
withdrawal of challenged feoffee to uses); Hil. 9 Hen. 6, 7, Fitzherbert Abridgement,
Challenge pl. 27, fol. 172r (C.P. 1431) (1431.183abr) (withdrawal of challenged
beneficiary); Y.B. Hil. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 29, fol. 20b (Exch. Ch. 1482) (1482.029) (Huse
C.J.K.B.: finding that a brother of a beneficiary could not be a juror in an action brought by
the feoffee).
48 Y.B. Pasch. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 6, fol. 2a (C.P. 1462) (1462.006) (Serjeant Littleton).
49 50 Edw. 3, ch. 6 (1376), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 398 (providing against feoffments
by persons intending to put their lands beyond the reach of creditors while retaining the
profits of their lands). The later statute of 19 Hen. 7, ch. 15 (1504), in 2 Statutes of the
Realm 660, went well beyond this early statute in protecting creditors and lords from the
effects of uses.
50 1 Ric. 2, ch. 9 (1377), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 3-4 (providing against feoffment of
lords and great men of the realm by those who dispossess landholders where such feoffors
take the profits); 4 Hen. 4, ch. 7 (1402), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 134 (giving an action
against those who dispossess landholders and take the profits of the land after enfeoffing
others).
51 15 Ric. 2, ch. 7 (1391), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 80 (providing against feoffments to
the use of ecclesiastical persons).
52 1 Ric. 3, ch. 1 (1484), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 477 (providing that sales, grants, and
leases by beneficiaries of uses convey title against feoffees).
53 4 Hen. 7, ch. 17 (1489), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 540-41 (titled “an Act Against
Fraudulent Feoffments Tending to Defraud the King of His Wards”).
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interpreting these statutes, lawyers and judges of the common law courts
showed their familiarity with uses and their enforcement. Common lawyers
often referred to feoffors and other beneficiaries of uses, or cestuys que use, as
pernors (takers) of profits in applying statutes of 1377 and 1402.54 The statute
of 1484 in favor of purchasers from beneficiaries drew the most attention from
lawyers and judges of common law courts, measured by the number of cases
reported dealing with that statute.55
Littleton’s Tenures had very little to say about uses, but two subsequent
treatises on common law that proved almost as popular among lawyers and law
students gave uses far more attention. Christopher St. German, a lawyer, wrote
Doctor and Student, first published in two parts in 1528 and 1530, to
demonstrate that while English law departed in some respects from the
commands of conscience, in other ways it was congruent with divine law and
reason.56 Law students eagerly bought up copies of Doctor and Student for its
legal content. St. German wrote in the form of a dialogue between a
theologian and a lawyer, bringing out the rigor of the common law and its
scope for sharp practice and manipulation. Given that his topic was the real or
apparent divergence between conscience and law, St. German also discussed
feoffment to uses.
In the voice of the lawyer, St. German wrote that generally every feoffment
would be presumed to be a feoffment to the use of the feoffor unless there had
been a bargain or recompense or other expression of the feoffor’s intent to
benefit the feoffee.57 As a Justice of Common Pleas put it in a case of 1522,
“common reason dictates that if I enfeoff someone without consideration or
causa it shall be to my use . . . .”58 St. German explained that the feoffor
would have to sue in chancery for his remedy59 and that in this respect the law
applied by chancery accorded with conscience.60
Next in the dialogue, St. German’s theologian asked the lawyer “how uses
began, and why so much land has been put in use in this realm”61 so that “few
men be sole seised of their own lands.”62 The lawyer answered that uses

54

See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Early English Equity, 1 L.Q. REV. 162, 167 (1885).
The Author’s database of Year Book reports shows that the 1484 statute was cited or
referenced in more cases than any of these other statutes.
56 ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, at First Dialogue, prologue, fol. 1b (1528),
reprinted in 91 S.S. 3 (1974).
57 Id. at ch. 21, fol. 52a-52b (1528), 91 S.S. 220 (1974).
58 Gervys v. Cooke, Y.B. Mich. 14 Hen. 8, pl. 5, 119 S.S. 108, 116-17 (C.P. 1522)
(1522.014ss) (Broke, J.C.P.). The same point is made in a manuscript report probably
written in 1533. Reports of John Caryll, Jr., pl. 13, 121 S.S. 366, 374 (Inner Temple, c.
1533).
59 ST. GERMAN, supra note 56, at Second Dialogue, ch. 21, fol. 53a, 91 S.S. 221.
60 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 21, fol. 53b, 91 S.S. 221.
61 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 21, fol. 54a, 91 S.S. 221.
62 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 22, fol. 56a, 91 S.S. 223.
55
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derived from the law of reason, that land in England had two aspects, the
freehold and the authority to take the profits of the land.63 He explained that,
in reason and conscience, one who had both could give only the possession and
freehold to another and keep the profits to himself, “seeing there is no law
made to prohibit” this.64
As to why so much land had been put in use, St. German’s lawyer said that
it would be long and perhaps “tedious” to list all the causes for the prevalence
of uses.65 He admitted that uses had been employed to mislead and intimidate
rival claimants of land, to evade mortmain, to evade creditors, and to deprive
lords of wardships, but said that statutes had remedied these abuses.66 The two
principal causes listed by the lawyer for the creation of uses were to make wills
of land and to give effect to marriage settlements.67
John Perkins, also a lawyer, wrote a work in 1528 that became known in
later editions by the title A Profitable Book.68 He intended the work to be a
supplement to Littleton’s Tenures, focusing on aspects of conveyancing not
dealt with by Littleton. Perkins mentioned uses in many chapters of A
Profitable Book, but a chapter on devises particularly addressed the subject,
setting forth a number of detailed rules about enforcement of uses. Perkins
wrote, as had St. German, that every feoffment was presumed to be made to
the feoffor’s use unless the feoffee gave consideration.69 He added that this
presumption had arisen very early, when the statute Quia emptores of 1290
permitted feoffment over a lord’s objection.70
Another lawyer writing between 1522 and 1536 asserted that “there were
trusts in the time of Edward I, as appears by the statute of Marlborough” of
1267, which prohibited feoffments depriving lords of their wardships.71 Both
dates 1267 and 1290 were considerably earlier than the first trace modern
historians can find of the employment of uses in England.72 A Justice of
Common Pleas said in 1502 that chancery had begun enforcing uses against

63

Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 22, fol. 54a, 91 S.S. 222.
Id. The theologian objected that this seemed to be a grant combined with a reservation
that deprived the grant of nearly all of its practical effect, which was void in most
circumstances. The lawyer’s effort to distinguish valid uses from such void grants was not
very persuasive.
65 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 22, fol. 55b, 91 S.S. 223.
66 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 22, fol. 56a-57a, 91 S.S. 223-24.
67 Id. at Second Dialogue, ch. 22, fol. 57a, 91 S.S. 224.
68 JOHN PERKINS, A PROFITABLE BOOK, TREATING THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at vii (photo.
reprint 1978) (1827) (first published 1528 as Perutilis tractatus).
69 Id. § 533, at 102-03.
70 Id. §§ 528-29, at 101-02.
71 Uses pl. 141, Roger Yorke’s Notebook, 120 S.S. 141 (before 1536) (referring to the
Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 6 (1267), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 19).
72 See supra text accompanying note 21.
64
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feoffees in the reign of Edward III (1327-1377),73 again a considerably earlier
period than modern historians assign to the first petitions for chancery to
enforce uses.74 These lawyers and judges of the early sixteenth century
showed an awareness that there had been uses for about two hundred years,
and that most of the land in England had come to be held in uses.
V.

COMMON LAW JUDGES AND LAWYERS IN CHANCERY

Lawyers kept and copied reports of thousands of cases decided in the courts
of common law, in a series known as the Year Books, and they excerpted
manuscript reports of cases in compilations called abridgements. Among these
Year Books are fourteen cases that report proceedings in chancery to enforce
uses. In the first five of these cases, dating from 1452 to 1459, four of them
from early abridgements, the chancellor’s deputy, the master of the rolls,
convened justices of the common law courts to get advice on how to enforce
uses.75 These reports show that common law judges and lawyers were familiar
with this new interest, the use, and that they applied their learning and their
craft, the detailed rules of the common law rules to the ways in which feoffees
and beneficiaries would deal with the use.
A series of four short cases in chancery from 1465 reported proceedings to
enforce uses, discussing issues of a half-sister relationship, commission of
felony, and conflicting expressions of a feoffor’s intent, without naming any
lawyers or judges involved.76 In a longer case before the chancellor in 1467,
all the common law judges discussed the rights of a woman who had set up a

73 Dod v. Chyttynden, Caryll’s Reports 15 Hen. 7, pl. 258, 116 S.S. 395-96 (C.P. 1502)
(Vavasour, J.C.P.: “le subpena commence en temps Edward le tierce, mes ceo fuit touts foits
envers le feoffee sur confidence mesme”).
74 See supra text accompanying note 40.
75 Trin. 30 Hen. 6, Statham Abridgement, Devise pl. 8, fol. 71v-72r (Chan. & Exch. Ch.
1452) (1452.032abr) (also reported in abridgements by Anthony Fitzherbert and Robert
Brooke) (stating that one judge saw no difference between a feoffment and a devise); Mich.
31 Hen. 6, Statham Abridgement, Conscience pl. 1, fol. 51v (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1452)
(1452.043abr) (also reported in Fitzherbert’s Abridgement) (discussing whether a feoffor
who had already transferred land to a feoffee had the right to change his mind regarding to
whom the land would devised); 31 Hen. 6, Statham Abridgement, Sub pena pl. 1, fol. 169v
(Chan. 1453) (1453.038abr) (also reported in Fitzherbert’s Abridgement) (providing that if a
feoffee created a feoffment himself, the original feoffor must recover from his feoffee and
not the third party); Hil. 35 Hen. 6, 2 Fitzherbert Abridgement, Sub pena pl. 22, fol. 188r
(Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1457) (1457.036abr) (collecting money for a daughter’s marriage from
defendant’s enfeoffed lands); Y.B. Trin. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 23, fol. 35b-36a (Chan. & Exch. Ch.
1459) (1459.046) (also reported in Fitzherbert’s and Brooke’s Abridgements) (refusing to
make enfeoffed land available to person with claims against the feoffor).
76 Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, pl. 16, fol. 7b (Chan. 1465) (1465.119); Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, pl.
17, fol. 7b (Chan. 1465) (1465.120); Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 7b (Chan. 1465)
(1465.121); Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, pl. 20, fol. 8a (Chan. 1465) (1465.123).
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trust for herself and then had married.77 In a 1474 case, Justice Littleton and
another justice advised the chancery not to delay in enforcing a use against the
underage heir of a feoffee.78 And in a 1481 case, Littleton advised the
chancellor whether to enforce a use set up by an infant feoffor.79
Five more cases from 1492 to 1495 featured leading lawyers and justices
from the common law courts debating questions of enforcement of uses in
chancery.80 In 1502, an odd case took place in the Court of King’s Bench, a
common law court, where lawyers and justices fully engaged in arguments
about how feoffees would be held to the instructions of their feoffors.81 There
was no suggestion in any of these cases that feoffments to uses and wills of
land were illegitimate or fraudulent.
Finally, one of the last cases reported in the Year Book series, which can be
called Lord Dacre’s Case, was a pitched battle between lawyers and judges of
the common law courts to determine once and for all the legitimacy and very
existence of the use.82 This case was the culmination of a nine-year campaign
by lawyers advancing the interests of Henry VIII to attack the two-century-old
practice of uses at its core, and is discussed in Part VII below. This case too
originated in chancery.83

77

Y.B. Trin. 7 Edw. 4, pl. 8, fol. 14b (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1467) (1467.038), reprinted in
2 SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, 64 S.S. 12-13 (M. Hemmant ed., 1948), and
in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO
1750, at 108-09 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010) (1986).
78 Y.B. Mich. 14 Edw. 4, 2 Fitzherbert Abridgement, Sub pena pl. 14, fol. 1. Huse,
C.J.K.B. disagreed with chancery’s enforcement of uses against a feoffee’s heir in Y.B.
Pasch. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 6a-6b (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1482) (1482.086).
79 Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 10, fol. 24a-24b (Chan. 1481) (1481.041).
80 Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. 7, pl. 4, fol. 7b-8b (Chan. 1492) (1492.012); Y.B. Pasch. 8 Hen. 7,
pl. 3, fol. 11b-12a (Chan. 1493) (1493.006) (concerning profits feoffees took to pay
annuities); Y.B. Mich. 10 Hen. 7, pl. 6, fol. 4b-5a (Chan. 1494) (1494.046) (penalizing a
defendant 100 pounds for not returning an estate that was enfeoffed to the plaintiff’s use);
Y.B. Pasch. 10 Hen. 7, pl. 9, fol. 20a (Chan. 1495) (1495.027) (finding that a married
woman as executrix could make a sale of land to her husband); Y.B. Pasch. 10 Hen. 7, pl.
[13], fol. 20b-21a (Chan. 1495) (1495.031) (discussing whether a life tenant who attempted
to convey a fee simple forfeited his life estate).
81 Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 7, pl. 10, fol. 1a (1499.024); Y.B. Trin. 15 Hen. 7, pl. 22, fol. 11b12b (1500.030). This case is reported at much greater length in Caryll’s Reports, pl. 262,
116 S.S. 401-404 (K.B. 1502) and Keilway 46, 72 Eng. Rep. 204 (K.B. 1502).
82 Re Lord Dacre of the South (Lord Dacre’s Case), Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 22, fol.
7b-10a (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026). The remainder of this case is published in
Spelman’s Reports, Uses pl. 4, 94 S.S. 228-230. See also BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77,
at 127-32.
83 Re Lord Dacre of the South (Lord Dacre’s Case), Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 22, fol. 7b
(Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026).
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VI. FINDING TRUST IN THE EARLY COMMON LAW
The word trust is usually thought to have replaced the word use as the name
of this landholding arrangement after 1536, when the Statute of Uses was
enacted. But lawyers and judges before 1500 used the word trust frequently to
refer to feoffments to uses. The word entered Middle English from Old Norse
and is frequently attested in religious and literary texts and correspondence
after 1200.84
Lawyers’ texts were in Latin or in French. Use, a technical term, is our
translation of the French oeps and Latin usus. Lawyers used the French
affiance to express the notion of trust, as in a buyer’s trust in a seller that a
horse was sound (and action for deceit when the horse was not).85 Two 1452
cases in an abridgement published about 1490 used the word trust in relation to
uses.86 Another abridgement of the same case published in 1514 used the word
confidence, an English word of Latin derivation, instead of trust.87 Petitions on
the rolls of Parliament from 1442 and 1455 mentioned feoffment “upon trust”
and those enfeoffed “of trust.”88 Two cases in a 1462 Year Book, first printed
around 1510, quoted a judge as referring to a feoffee “on confidence”89 and
quoted Thomas Littleton, then a lawyer, speaking of certain persons enfeoffed
“on confidence.”90 In 1464 another lawyer likewise spoke of a plaintiff
enfeoffed to the use of the defendant “on confidence,” then added that the
defendant made the feoffment to the plaintiff “by trust and confidence.”91 In
84MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1139-40 (1997), available at http://quod.lib.umich.
edu/cgi/m/mec/med-idx?type=id&id=MED47299 (defining trust); 18 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 623-24 (2d ed. 1989).
85 E.g., Y.B. Mich. 13 Hen. 4, pl. 4, fol. 1a-2a (C.P. 1411) (1411.053) (Thirning,
C.J.C.P.: “pur l’ affiance que jay en vous”).
86 Trin. 30 Hen. 6, Devise pl. 8, in Statham Abridgement, fol. 71v-72r (Ch. & Exch. Ch.
1452) (1452.032abr) (Fortescue, C.J.K.B.: “le dit devise fuit de trust &c.; il fuist de trust”);
Mich. 31 Hen. 6, Conscience pl. 1, in Statham Abridgement, fol. 51b (Chan. & Exch. Ch.
1452) (1452.043abr) (une feoffement de trust).
87 Trin. 30 Hen. 6, Devise pl. 22, in Fitzherbert Abridgement fol. 243r (1452.032abr) (“le
devise fuit de confidence; il fuit de confidence”); Mich. 31 Hen. 6, Sub pena 23, in 2
Fitzherbert Abridgement fol. 188r (1452.043abr) (“feffement de confidence”).
88 5 Rotuli Parliamentorum 57, 20 Hen. 6, no. 1 (1442) (The Parliament Rolls of
Medieval England, Scholarly Digital Editions, CD-ROM, rel. 2005) (“[T]he seid Feffees
have no title ner interesse therynne, but only upon trust, and to his use, to execute his wille .
. . .”); 5 Rotuli Parliamentorum 295, 33 Hen. 6, no. 1 (1455) (The Parliament Rolls of
Medieval England, Scholarly Digital Editions, CD-ROM, rel. 2005) (“[L]ondes or
tenementes of which we were enfeoffed by them of trust, in which we had never title . . . but
onely by the feoffement made by us in trust.”).
89 Y.B. Pasch. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 6, fol. 2a, 2b (C.P. 1462) (1462.006) (Danvers, J.C.P.: “mon
feoffee sur confidence”).
90 Y.B. Pasch. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 11, fol. 5b (C.P. 1462) (1462.011) (Serjeant Littleton: “un W.
aiel le plaintif enfeoffa certein persons sur confidence; le feoffees sur confidence”).
91 Y.B. Pasch. 4 Edw. 4, pl. 9, fol. 8a-8b (C.P. 1464) (1464.012) (Serjeant Catesby: “al
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1465 a feoffment “of trust” was reported.92 Then in 1468 the chancellor spoke
of feoffment “in trust,”93 and the Justices of Common Pleas described the
duties of a “feoffee of a trust” to plead all pleas and to maintain an action for
the land as the cestuy que use would want to plead, but this would be at the
costs of the cestuy que use.94 This lattermost example also provides a glimpse
of what would now be called fiduciary duties of these predecessors of our
trustees, as seen by judges of a common law court.
At the start of the 1470s, Year Books contain broader uses of the word trust.
In 1471 justices held clearly that offices granted by the king were held “on
trust and confidence”95 and a chief justice said that “when I place trust and
confidence in you and I am deceived, I will have an action for deceit.”96 Then
in 1477 a lawyer argued that “in every such bargain the law presumes
(entende) that as the one puts his trust in the other to have the thing for which
he bargains, that so ought the other” put his trust in the first one.97 In 1478
perhaps the same lawyer said that each party to a bargain “ought to put the
other in trust.”98
Meanwhile, examples continued in a regular stream of Year Book cases
from 1469 through 1482 calling uses feoffments “in trust” or more frequently,
“of trust,” all in the reign of Edward IV.99 For some reason, beginning in 1489
use le defendant &c. sur confidence; le defendant fist le feoffment al plaintif per trust &
confidence”).
92 Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, pl. 16, fol. 7b (Chan. 1465) (1465.119) (“si home fait feoffement
de trust de terre; fait feoffement de trust sans declarer de son volunt”).
93 Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 4, pl. 11, fol. 4b (Chan. 1468) (1468.018) (Stillington, L.C.: “si jeo
enfeoffe un home en trust”).
94 Y.B. Hil. [8] Edw. 4, pl. 15, fol. 29b (C.P. 1469) (1469.015) (“Nota que il fuit tenus
per les Justices que un feoffe de trust est tenus de pleder touts plees”).
95 Y.B. Trin. 11 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 1a-2a (Exch. Ch. 1471) (1471.001) (“fuit clerement
tenus que tiels offices queux sont grantes per le Roy a un home sur trust & confidence”).
Also, in Y.B. Hil. 21 Edw. 4, pl. [38], fol. 83b, 84a (C.P. 1482) (1482.067), Bryan, C.J.C.P.
spoke of an “office of trust” which the office-holder could not grant over.
96 Y.B. Trin. 11 Edw. 4, pl. 10, fol. 6a, 6a-6b (C.P. 1471) (1471.010) (Bryan, C.J.C.P.:
“quant jeo done trust & confidence a vous, si jeo fuy disceive, jeo avera action de Disceit”).
97 Y.B. Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, pl. 2, fol. 1a-2b (C.P. 1477) (1477.013) (Serjeant Catesby: “en
chescun tiel bargaine le ley entende que come l’ un mist son trust en l’ auter pur aver le
chose pur que ils bargaynent, que issint duist l’ auter ‘e contra’”).
98 Y.B. Hil. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 21b, 22a (C.P. 1479) (1479.001) (“chescun d’ eux
covient mist l’ auter en trust”).
99 Y.B. Mich. 9 Edw. 4, pl. 26, fol. 41a, 41b (Chan. 1469) (1469.115) (Serjeant Catesby:
“son pere luy enfeoff de trust”); Y.B. Trin. 11 Edw. 4, pl. 13, fol. 8a (Chan. 1471)
(1471.013) (“si mon feoffee de trust”); Y.B. Mich. 12 Edw. 4, pl. 5, fol. 12b (1472)
(1472.043) (Serjeant Catesby: “lou home fait foffement de trust”); Y.B. Trin. 16 Edw. 4, pl.
1, fol. 4b (Chan. 1476) (1476.020) (“il est enfeoffe en trust”); Y.B. Mich. 16 Edw. 4, pl. 2,
fol. 7b-8a (K.B. 1476) (1476.030) (“plaintif ne fuist sinon que feoffee de trust”); Y.B. Pasch.
21 Edw. 4, pl. 10, fol. 24a, 24b (Chan. 1481) (1481.041) (Apprentice Digas: “feoffements de
trust; si le pere fait feoffement de trust”; Littleton, J.C.P.: “ces feffees de trust”); Y.B. Mich.
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during the reign of Henry VII, the language of trust for uses is replaced by
reporting of feoffments “on confidence,”100 as Littleton had written in his
Tenures and said in a case of 1462,101 and as Fitzherbert had printed in his
abridgement of 1452 cases.102 Twelve more cases through to 1504 reported
feoffments or feoffees sur confidence.103 One notable variation in a 1502 case
already noted above was mention of “the confidence” and “the confidence and
the use” by a chief justice.104
In the small number of Year Book reports for the early part of the reign of
Henry VIII, the two terms came together and the reports show judges of
common law courts viewing uses as established in common law and grounded
on trust and confidence. A notable and lengthy 1522 case in Common Pleas
prompted arguments about the nature of uses and their role in the common
law.105 The case was about a taking of cattle, a right to collect rent from a
parcel of land, a release made by a beneficiary, and behind all of this, a
feoffment to uses.106 As the judges went through the arguments, they depicted
uses as a form of landholding integrated with the common law and justified by
reason because necessity required putting trust in others.107
Justice Fitzherbert said that uses were at common law and that a use was
nothing but trust and confidence that the feoffor put in the person of his feoffee
according to his estate, and that this was at common law.108 He went on to say

21 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 37b, [38]a (C.P. 1481) (1481.069) (“enfeoffa . . . auters de trust”); Y.B.
Hil. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 29, fol. 20b (Exch. Ch. 1482) (1482.029) (Huse, C.J.K.B.: “issint est en
feoffement en trust”); Y.B. Pasch. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 6a, 6b (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1482)
(1482.086) (Rotherham, L.C.: “sur feoffement de trust”; Huse, C.J.K.B.: “si home ust
enfeoffe un auter de trust”).
100 E.g., Y.B. Mich. 5 Hen. 7, pl. 11, fol. 5b, 6a (C.P. 1489) (1489.042) (Serjeant Fyneux;
the Court; Bryan, C.J.C.P.).
101 LITTLETON, supra note 41 § 462 (“[S]uch feoffment is made upon confidence . . . .”);
Y.B. Pasch. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 6 fol. 2a-4a (C.P. 1462) (1462.006).
102 Trin. 30 Hen. 6, Devise pl. 22, in Fitzherbert Abridgement fol. 243r (1452.032abr);
Mich. 31 Hen. 6, Sub pena 23, in 2 Fitzherbert Abridgement fol. 188r (1452.043abr).
103 The last in the Year Books of Henry VII is Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 18, fol. 8b, 9b
(C.P. 1504) (1504.018) (Kingsmill, J.C.P.). Exceptions to this pattern are Y.B. Mich. 18
Edw. 4, pl. 29, fol. 20a, 20b (C.P. 1478) (1478.100) (Serjeant Sulyard: “un soit enfeoffe sur
confidence en ma terre”; Littleton, J.C.P.: “en le case de feoffment sur confidence”), and
Y.B. Hil. 15 Hen. 7, pl. 3, fol. 2a (1500) (1500.003) (“Issint est ou en feffee de trust”).
104 Dod v. Chyttynden, Y.B. Mich. 15 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 13a, 13b (C.P. 1502) (1499.025)
(Frowyk, C.J.C.P.: “si on fait feffement sur confidence . . . or la confidence & le use est
determine, pur ceo que le feoffor ne mist le confidence en le heir le feffee . . . le grande part
del terre d’ Angleterre fuit in feoffements sur confidence”).
105 Gervys v. Cooke, Mich. 14 Hen. 8, pl. 5, 119 S.S. 108 (C.P. 1522) (1522.014ss).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 110.
108 Id. at 114 (Fitzherbert, J.C.P.: “lez usez sount al comen ley . . . . Et use nest forsque
trust et confydens, que le feoffour mytte en le parson son feoffee accordant a son estate, fuit
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that when feoffees performed the will of the feoffor after his death, the trust in
that case was by reason of necessity, because a dead man cannot perform his
own will, and therefore must put his trust in someone else to perform his
will.109 When he enfeoffed someone, Fitzherbert said, “my trust and
confidence is in him and in his heirs and assigns.”110 In the case at issue, the
trust was in the land out of which the rent was granted.111
The next judge to speak agreed that uses were “at common law, and by
common reason,” and that when the feoffor put confidence and trust, the
feoffee would be bound to his use.112 It was not conscience that gave rise to
uses, he said, but common reason, which was common law.113 The third judge
also agreed that uses were at common law and were nothing other than
confidence and trust, that every use was based on reason, and that the feoffees
were bound to act according to the trust, because otherwise they would deceive
their feoffor, which would be unreasonable.114 The Chief Justice of Common
Pleas spoke last, and although he disagreed with many of the positions taken
by his three colleagues, he said nothing one way or the other about the basic
nature of uses or their relation to the common law or to reason.115 One of his
colleagues joked to the Chief Justice that he had been arguing mainly for his
own pleasure.116
The statements of these three judges would seem to reflect a consensus
among common lawyers well attested from the cases and treatises. The
consensus was about to come under a ferocious, sustained, and ultimately
successful attack backed by no less important or opinionated a character than
the king himself. Henry VIII would have his way. Henry’s heavy-handed
intervention in this legal dispute has perpetuated the notion that the common
law was fundamentally opposed to uses, and to the notions of trust and
fiduciary duty that accompanied them.

al comen ley”). Fitzherbert recognized that at common law there was no remedy except by
way of chancery. Id. at 115 (“uncore al comen ley il navoit remedy mez par sub pena”).
109 Id. (“cest trust est de necessity, quar un mort home ne poit performer son volounte
demesne, et pur ceo covient de necessite de mytter son trust en un auter de performer son
volounte”).
110 Id. (“si jeo enfeffe B. . . . ore mon trust et confydens est en luy et en sez heirez et
assignez”).
111 Id. at 108.
112 Id. at 116 (Brooke, J.C.P.: “usez sount al comen ley, et par comen reason . . . . Et sir,
come le feffor mist confydens et trust issint serra son use”).
113 Id. (“conscyens ne fait use, mez comen reason: que est comen ley”).
114 Id. at 118 (Pollard, J.C.P.: “usez fueront al comen ley et nest auter forsque confidens
et trust. Et chescun use est par reson, et lez feffeez sount liez de fayre accordant al trust,
auterment ilz disceveront lour feffour, que ne serra reason”).
115 Id. at 120-21.
116 Id. at 122 (Brooke, J.C.P. to Brudenell, C.J.C.P.).
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VII. THE ATTACK ON USES
The legal challenge to the legitimacy of uses was begun by Thomas Audley.
A lawyer educated at Cambridge University, Audley was elected to Parliament
in 1523 and there supported taxes proposed by Cardinal Wolsey, Henry VIII’s
chancellor. This brought him to the attention of Wolsey and the royal court,
and Audley quickly climbed the ladder of royal preferment. One of Henry
VIII’s policies was to regain as much revenue as possible based on his rights as
feudal overlord, and one practice standing in the way of that revenue was the
use.
In 1526, the same year that Henry VIII began showing interest in Anne
Boleyn, Audley gave a reading at his Inn of Court, Inner Temple.117 This was
an educational exercise for the training of law students, supposed to be an
exposition of a statute, but Audley’s reading departed from the consensus of
the legal profession and announced a new government policy. His exposition
began in a conventional way. “I will show,” he said, “what a use is, how it is
made, and on what things a use may depend.”118 A use “is a property or
ownership of land . . . depending solely on confidence and trust between those
. . . accounted owners by the common law” and “those who have a use” in the
same land.119 This, Audley said, “is directly contrary to the learning of the
common law,” because if one made a feoffment on the proviso that the feoffee
should not take any of the profits, but the feoffor would keep the profits, “this
proviso is void.”120 Although uses were first contrived “for a good purpose,”
by which Audley probably meant the making of wills of land, “nevertheless to
a great extent they have been pursued by collusion for the evil purpose of
destroying the good laws of the realm.”121 Instead of the ordinary and certain
rules of common law, “now by reason of these trusts and confidences”
inheritances were thrown upon “a law called ‘conscience,’ which is always
uncertain” and depended on the chancellor’s notion of conscience.122 “And by
reason of this no man can know his title to any land with certainty.”123
Audley went on to recite the former mischiefs made possible by uses that
had been remedied by statutes.124 The main reason, he thought, why uses were
contrived was “to make good last wills of land, because land was not devisable
by the common law.”125 This showed that “at the beginning of the common
law there were no uses, but only confidence between person and person, which
117
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THOMAS AUDLEY, READING ON 4 HEN. 7, ch. 17 (Inner Temple, 1526), reprinted in
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was there from the beginning.”126 He hinted at an argument that since nearly
all the land in England was not devisable, wills of land carried out by feoffees
to uses were void.127
Audley’s reading seemed to incite something of a pamphlet war. An
anonymous lawyer wrote an angry reply to Christopher St. German’s Doctor
and Student.128 St. German had written approvingly of uses and had derived
them from the law of reason, but this lawyer said that uses “began of an untrue
and crafty invention to put the king and his subjects from” what they ought to
have by right, “the good, true common law of the realm.”129 Concluding a list
of the problems arising from uses that had already been corrected by statutes,
he said again that “by such uses the good common law of this realm . . . is
subverted and made as void.”130 Uses “began upon an untruth and false
purpose” because feoffors to uses gave the title and retained the profits, so
“these uses began by an untrue and crafty invention and continued by an
untruth and a deceit.”131 He denounced his fellow lawyers for maintaining
“this untrue and crafty invention in the Chancery by the colour of conscience,
contrary to the study and learning of the common law, and contrary to reason,
and also to the law of God.”132
In 1532 St. German replied that feoffments to uses deceived no one.133
Feoffees did not think they were getting the profits of the land. Feoffments to
uses and wills were drafted “by advice of learned counsel.”134 St. German
speculated that the angry lawyer himself “hath sometimes devised such uses as
hath been necessary for his clients, or for himself or his friends, and no craft or
falsehood.”135
Another lawyer who took Audley’s side said in Inner Temple, probably in
1533, that “a use was invented in the beginning with the intention of making a
fraud at common law, namely to make a declaration of a will and so to defraud
the right heir and oust the wife of her dower or oust tenancy by the curtesy,”
the corresponding right of a surviving husband to a life interest in his wife’s
lands.136
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Id.
Id.
128
REPLICATION OF SERJEANT AT LAW (c. 1531), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra
note 77, at 125.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id., reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77, at 126.
133 CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, LITTLE TREATISE ON THE SUBPOENA, reprinted in BAKER
& MILSOM, supra note 77, at 126-27.
134 Id., reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77, at 127.
135 Id.
136 Reports of John Caryll, Jr., pl. 13, 121 S.S. 374-75 (Inner Temple, c. 1533) (Hare).
127
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Bills put forward in Parliament in 1529 would have made invalid all uses of
any land unless the use was recorded in the Court of Common Pleas, and
would have given the king one-third of the value of the wardship of lands held
by feoffees to the use of the king’s tenants when the tenants left infant heirs at
their deaths.137 The House of Commons rejected Henry VIII’s effort to regain
one-third of his lost wardships.138 Henry VIII threatened the House of
Commons in March of 1531, “if you will not take some reasonable end now
when it is offered, I will search out the extremity of the law, and then I will not
offer you so much again.”139
Extremity of the law meant, in this case, a ruling that uses had always been
fraudulent, all the feoffors’ wills of land had been void, and the king and other
lords were owed all the wardship revenue they had foregone. Henry’s legal
advisers framed a test case to challenge the validity of uses and wills of land
before the courts of common law and get such a holding. Lord Dacre’s Case
arose this way. Whenever a tenant of the king died, officials of the king
convened an inquest by a jury, as to what revenues might be owed to the
king.140 Henry’s lawyers waited for the next peer of the realm to die with an
infant heir.
Thomas Fiennes, Lord Dacre of the South, died in September 1533 a tenant
of the king with lands held to uses and left a will paying his debts, raising
money for the marriages of some of his kinswomen, devising some land to
younger sons and arranging for the rest of the land to be held by his feoffees
until his heir (eldest son of his deceased eldest son) came of age and could take
it.141 It is hard to imagine a more typical example of the feoffments to uses
that English landholders had employed since the 1320s.
The inquest jury found in January 1534 that Lord Dacre’s will was made
“by fraud and collusion” between Lord Dacre and lawyers to defraud the king
of the wardship and marriage of his heir.142 Lord Dacre’s feoffees challenged
the inquest jury’s finding in February 1535.143 Such findings had to be
challenged in a Chancery Court, and the chancellor before whom the feoffees
came was Thomas Audley, who had started this assault on uses nine years
before.144
Audley and Thomas Cromwell, the king’s secretary, convened all the judges
of the common law courts in Paschal Term 1535 to hear arguments on behalf
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4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 450-51, app. III (1), (2).
Id. at 453.
HALL’S CHRONICLE 784 (1809), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77, at 123-
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of the king in support of the jury’s finding, and on behalf of the feoffees
against it. A lawyer named Richard Pollard argued for the king’s position:
[T]here are no such things as uses (nest ascun use). For if there should be
any use it must necessarily have some foundation, either by common law
or by statute. And it seems that there were no uses at common law, for it
would be inconsistent for me to enfeoff you with my land (and thus part
with it) and nevertheless to have it, contrary to my feoffment and gift.
There is no mention of uses in our old year books (auncient ans et livres),
and if there had been uses at common law it would have been mentioned
in our old law books.145
Pollard added a point made by Perkins in his Profitable Book, that no use (at
least no implied use) could have been created before the statute Quia emptores
of 1290.146 This meant for Pollard that uses could not have been customs from
time immemorial, since to be valid customs had to have been practiced since
the accession of Richard I in 1189. “Therefore, since these uses had their
beginning after that statute, they are not at common law. Neither are they by
statute, for no statute has been passed by which uses are made. Thus there are
no such thing as uses.”147 Pollard argued further that even if this extreme
argument were rejected, the use of land could not be devised because devises
of land were not allowed.148 Pollard was rewarded in May 1535 with the office
of King’s Remembrancer of the Exchequer, an office he kept until his death.149
Another lawyer for the king made less extreme arguments, and they were
opposed by three lawyers arguing for the feoffees’ side. The first of the
feoffees’s lawyers made the case that a will could not be said to be fraudulent
or collusive, because the law presumed that when one was on the point of
death he would not commit any deceit or fraud against another.150 The second
of the feoffees’s lawyers met Pollard’s argument head on:
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Re Lord Dacre of the South (Lord Dacre’s Case), Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 22, fol.
7b, 9a (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026), translated in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note
77, at 129 (Apprentice Pollard). The start of the translation (by J.H. Baker) is of the law
French “n’est ascun use.”
146 PERKINS, supra note 68, at 101.
147 Re Lord Dacre of the South (Lord Dacre’s Case), Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 22, fol.
7b, 9a (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026), translated in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note
77, at 129 (Apprentice Pollard).
148 Id.
149 J.H. Baker, Pollard, Sir Richard (d. 1542), in NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 757-58 (2004), available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/
69369 (“In May 1535 he was appointed king’s remembrancer of the exchequer, an office
that he held until his death.”).
150 Re Lord Dacre of the South (Lord Dacre’s Case), Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 22, fol.
7b (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026), translated in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77, at
127-28 (Apprentice Onley).
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[U]ses were at common law; for a use is nothing other than a trust which
the feoffor puts in the feoffees upon the feoffment. If we were to say that
there were no uses at common law, it would follow that there was no trust
at common law; and that cannot be, for a trust or confidence is something
very necessary between man and man, and at least no law prohibits or
restrains a man from putting his confidence in another. . . . [A]nd
moreover it has been held for many years that uses were at common law,
by the common opinion of the whole realm. So it seems to me that it
should no longer be disputed.151
If uses had always been void, this lawyer reasoned, then all the statutes
specifically addressing uses would have been void as well.152
The third of the feoffees’s lawyers began by saying that when one made his
last will at the point of death he could not carry it out himself “and for that
reason he puts his trust in others and declares his will to be carried out by
others.”153 He argued in the roundabout style of the time:
[U]ses were at common law. For the common law is nothing but
common reason, and common reason wills that a man may put his trust in
another; and a use is a trust between the feoffor and the feoffee, which
trust is by common reason (as I have said) and common reason is
common law: and therefore it follows that uses are by the common law.154
The many statutes regulating uses, he argued, also showed that “uses were at
common law.”155 Taking a more practical tack, he warned that “it would be a
great mischief to change the law now, for many inheritances in the realm
depend today on uses, so that there would be much confusion” if all wills
carried out under uses were declared void.156 Instead, the common law should
follow the Latin maxim communis error facit ius,157 which I might roughly
translate: if everybody has been doing it wrong, let’s just call it right and keep
doing it.
I have repeated these arguments at length because they came at a climactic
moment in the history of the use and because they represent the culmination of
decades of cases, treatises, and statutes reflecting the incorporation of uses into
the common law tradition. Not only the expectations and stability of English
landholding but the independence of the English judiciary hung in the balance.
We have a judge’s manuscript report, which circulated after his death, for
what happened next.158 After this argument, the judges of the common law
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courts gave their opinions, except for one judge who was away on the king’s
business in Wales.159 Chancellor Audley, Secretary Cromwell (who was no
judge of any court), and three of the judges agreed with Pollard and Henry VIII
that Lord Dacre’s will was ineffective and void because neither land nor the
use of land could be devised by will.160 Four of the judges were of the contrary
opinion, that a will was “a declaration of trust” showing the feoffee the
feoffor’s intention as to how in conscience the feoffee should act.161 A fifth
judge, John Port, was of the same opinion as the four against the king, but
“spoke so softly” that the chancellor and the secretary thought he agreed with
them and therefore thought they had a slim majority.162 Next all the justices
were commanded to appear before the king.163 Henry VIII commanded them
to agree in their opinions, and told them that “those who were of the opinion
that the will was void would have the king’s good thanks.”164 One of the
judges who opposed the king was conveniently ill, and the others, perceiving
the number and influence of those arrayed against them, “conformed with” the
king’s opinion.165 Audley and six of these same judges had presided a month
earlier at the trial of Thomas More, a former chancellor, for high treason in
denying the king’s supremacy, leading to More’s execution later the same
year.166
This story has come to an end. Lord Dacre’s Case, as the feoffees’ lawyer
predicted, threw all inheritances by will into confusion. Henry VIII had gone
to the extremity of the law. Parliament swiftly agreed to the Statute of Uses,
enacted in 1536, which validated all uses and wills prior to Lord Dacre’s death
and henceforth, for all future uses, transferred title from the feoffees to the
beneficiaries.167 After this statute, another development, also demonstrating
the importance of trust and fiduciary principles in the common law, converted
the medieval use into the modern trust. As for Henry VIII, he declared victory
more publicly in 1536: “[T]he grounds of all those uses were false, and never
S.S. 228 (Chan. & Exch. Ch. 1535) (1535.026). Another translation of this is available in
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 77, at 131-32.
159 Id. at 230.
160 Id. at 228-29 (Lyster, C.B.Ex., Baldwin, C.J.C.P., and Luke, J.K.B.).
161 Id. at 229-30 (Spelman, J.K.B., Shelley, J.C.P., Fitzherbert, J.C.P., and Fitzjames,
C.J.K.B.).
162 Id. at 230 (“mez il parla cy base”).
163 Id.
164 Id. (“avoent de roy bon thanke”).
165 Id.
166 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON,
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS: FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE
REIGN OF KING GEORGE II, at 59 (3d ed. London 1742), available at World Trials Library on
HeinOnline.
167 BEAN, supra note 21, at 286-87 (“All devises of land by will made by those who died
before I May 1536 were to remain valid. . . . [N]ow [the Statute of Uses] . . . declared that
the cestui que use was the real owner of the land.”).
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admitted by any law, but usurped upon the prince, contrary to all equity and
justice, as it hath been openly both disputed and declared by all the well
learned men in the realm of England in Westminster Hall.”168
VIII. FINDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE EARLY COMMON LAW
Long before the invention of uses, judges and lawyers of the common law
courts developed remedies that we would now identify as recognition and
enforcement of fiduciary duties. In the action of account, landholders sued
their bailiffs and rent collectors, and the court forced them to account for the
money they had received from third parties on the landholder’s behalf.169
Defendants who refused to account or who were found in arrears could be
committed to prison.170 When courts extended the duty of accounting to agents
who received money from their principals to trade on their behalf, judges
determined that the proper measure of damages was not merely refunding the
money initially invested, but rather, as one judge said in 1379, “you shall be
charged in respect of reasonable profits.”171 As Joshua Getzler points out in
his contribution to this Conference, this remedy in the common law action of
account embodied fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and prudence.172 It is no
surprise that chancery took over the action of account in later centuries.173
The action of waste also had a fiduciary character. It arose in the context of
wardship, the right of a lord to take rents and profits from the land of an infant
heir.174 Some of England’s earliest statutes devised remedies against lords
who abused their temporary guardianship over their tenants’ heirs. Four of the
first five chapters of Magna Carta gave remedies for heirs against their
guardians for withholding or wasting their inheritances.175 The Provisions of
Westminster in 1259, the Statute of Marlborough in 1267, the Statute of
Westminster First in 1275, and the Statute of Gloucester in 1278 all confirmed
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ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I at 221 (2d ed. 1898).
170 Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23 (1267), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 24;
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 11 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 80-81.
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(Belknap, C.J.C.P.).
172 Joshua Getzler, “As if.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV.
973, 978 (2011).
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175 Magna Carta, chs. 2-5 (1215), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 451-52 (2d ed.
1992) (fixing the payment a lord could demand for admitting the heir to his inheritance,
remitting this payment when the heir was underage, forbidding destruction or damage to the
heir’s land, and requiring the guardian to maintain the land for the heir as it was before the
wardship began).
169

2011]

EARLY COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY DUTY

1035

or extended remedies against guardians who refused to turn over lands to the
heirs when they reached the age of twenty-one, or who laid waste to the heirs’
lands.176 Heirs of land held by socage tenure, a bit below the status of knight
service, could bring actions of account against their guardians.177 In the Year
Books, judges enforced the duties of guardians to heirs with rigor.178
Executors distributed the personal property that a deceased testator left by
will. They came under the jurisdiction and supervision of ecclesiastical
courts.179 Since executors also paid their testator’s debts, they frequently sued
and were sued in common law courts. Common law judges and lawyers
worked out rules that executors would be forced to pay the testator’s debts out
of their own goods if they had wasted the testator’s goods or converted them to
their own use.180 They said that executors acted improperly if they bought the
testator’s goods for themselves, what would now be called self-dealing.181
The full range of fiduciary duties in modern law far exceeds what early
common law courts required in actions of account and waste and by penalties
for executors’ dealings with their testators’ goods. Nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to recognize that the early common law found ways to impose
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Provisions of Westminster, 43 Hen. 3, chs. 16-17 (1259), in 1 Statutes of the Realm
10 (heir’s remedy for lands withheld after wardship, duty of guardian in socage to commit
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though strangers had knocked down houses on the heir’s land).
179 See HELMHOLZ, supra note 34, at 376.
180 E.g., Y.B. Trin. 2 Hen. 6, pl. 4, fol. 12b, 13a (C.P. 1424) (1424.002) (explaining that
an executor who sold or wasted the testator’s goods would repay the testator’s debts with
the executor’s own goods); Y.B. Hil. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 6, fol. 49b (C.P. 1441) (1441.033)
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own use).
181 E.g., Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 2, fol. 21b, 22a (C.P. 1481) (1481.033) (requiring
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that executors’ self-dealing was improper).
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some of the same sort of duties that would later be called fiduciary when one
person had temporary control of land, money, or goods on behalf of another.
CONCLUSION
“Without a doubt, the greatest threat to the common-law system [in the reign
of Henry VIII] was the ‘use.’”182 This was the conclusion of two notable legal
historians of the sixteenth century, E.W. Ives and J.A. Guy. It suggests that
Thomas Audley’s and Richard Pollard’s arguments still hold sway. There was
a battle over the use in the reign of Henry VIII, but this Essay suggests that the
battle was between the king and vast majority of the legal profession. Most
lawyers and judges of the common law did not view uses as a threat to their
system. Starting in the 1320s, surely there were lawyers at the origin of the
use. They seem to have secured in short order the absolutely necessary
professional consensus that the common law would not enforce the use.
Unless the use was incapable of passing any legally recognized right, title, or
interest to the intended beneficiaries, it would have had no effectiveness to
transfer the benefits of landholding in violation of the rules against wills of
land and the feudal incidents of wardship and marriage.
Uses were thus in essence a legal fiction, with all sides in agreement that
one state of affairs would appear on the legal record, full legal title to the
feoffees, while a completely different state of affairs would be given effect in
real life, effective wills of land without loss to the heirs by wardship or
marriage.
Contrary to what lawyers seeking to curry favor from Henry VIII argued,
the predominant motive for uses was neither fraud nor deception. The desire
to direct the future course of landholding after one’s death by will seems to
have been the overriding motive for this practice. Anglo-Saxons had the
capacity to make wills of land, and after the Norman Conquest all property
other than land could be left by will. Free alienation of land by a sale or grant
during one’s lifetime was guaranteed by the statute Quia emptores in 1290 for
all except tenants who held directly of the king. The rule that lands must not
be devised by will appeared by 1200, but was never fully incorporated in the
expectations of the people of England.183 Every lawyer knew that in the city of
London and some boroughs, land was devisable.
Only the king was the overall loser in this arrangement. Yet kings before
Henry VIII and his father freely gave permission for their chief tenants to
enfeoff others to their uses. Kings were thus complicit in waiving their
wardships and other feudal incidents. Two statutes enacted in the first year of
Richard III’s reign dealt with uses. One, already mentioned, enabled
beneficiaries of uses to transfer title to purchasers.184 The other directed who
182 E.W. IVES, THE COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND 197 (1983);
accord J.A. GUY, CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN ON CHANCERY AND STATUTE 75 (1985); .
183 MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 268-69, 281 (1963).
184 1 Ric. 3 ch. 1, (1484), in 2 Statutes of the Realm 477-78.
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should take over the fiduciary duties of the king himself, who was at his
accession a feoffee to uses.185
Those most involved in enforcing uses were likewise those most closely
associated with the king’s interests. The entire judiciary, the top of the legal
profession, and of course the chancellor all owed their appointments to the
king and were subject to removal at his whim. It is a measure of their early
independence from the king’s own fiscal interests that uses persisted for more
than two centuries without any legal challenge to the fiction that allowed them
to exist.
This Essay has shown that uses were by no means invisible to the common
law. Yes, the common law would not enforce the fiduciary relationship at the
heart of uses, because if it did the whole enterprise would collapse, but
common lawyers talked about uses in the king’s courts and in chancery as if
creating uses, enforcing uses, and transacting about uses were an ordinary and
essential part of their learning and craft, their common law.
The earliest evidence we have of judges and lawyers talking about uses in
England speaks of trust as the linchpin of this landholding arrangement. The
many case reports in which judges and lawyers spoke of uses and trust in the
Year Books nearly all elaborated what now would be called fidiciary duties
owed by feofees to their beneficiaries. But trust and fiduciary duty can also be
found beyond feoffments to uses, in the common law rules governing
guardians, bailiffs, executors, and administrators, as well as in canon law.
This Essay has laid some blame for a long misunderstanding of the role of
trust, trusting, and fiduciary duty in the common law at the feet of a handful of
strident, ambitious, political lawyers seeking the favor of Henry VIII. But
some of the blame also goes to legal historians, myself included, who have
generalized the character or personality of the early common law as one that
rewarded sharp practice and manipulation of the rules for self-interest. This
impression ignored the common law doctrines that gave us some of our
important fiduciary duties, such as the bailiffs’ and receivers’ duties to account
for money collected on behalf of a landlord, and the guardians’ duties to avoid
waste of an heir’s land.
The image of the scheming, self-interested, untrustworthy common law
comes principally, I think, from the rules most often repeated and enforced in
my sources, the Year Books. These were the medieval rules of pleading, civil
procedure, in which adversarial battles of wits were carried out in front of a
judge. It is too easy to take these vivid performances as a model for the rest of
law, for substantive law. But the artificial arena of the medieval courtroom is
not a model of all human relationships. I am grateful to Tamar Frankel for
opening our eyes to the ways in which trust and fiduciary duty can be found at
the root of our legal tradition centuries ago, as well as at its heart today.
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